If America Strikes Iran's Pickaxe Mountain: Can Granite Withstand Bunker Busters, or Will the Region Enter the Nuclear Age?
A strategic and technical study in four hypothetical scenarios: from conventional bombing to the hydrogen weapon
In the heart of Iran, some 220 kilometres south of Tehran and close to the Natanz nuclear facility, rises Pickaxe Mountain, known in Persian as Kuh e Kolang Gaz La.
This mountain is no longer just a natural landmark. It has become one of the most mysterious sites in the nuclear confrontation between the United States and Iran.
The facility carved inside it enjoys natural protection from layers of granite rock, which raises a grave strategic question: what if the United States decided to destroy it, and discovered that its most powerful conventional bombs could not reach it?
Would Washington settle for disabling the facility, or would it consider crossing the nuclear red line?
First: a mountain 1,600 metres high, but how deep is the facility really?
A widely circulated claim needs correcting here. The mountain rises about 1,608 metres above sea level, but that does not mean there are 1,500 metres of granite above the facility.
Estimates based on satellite imagery suggest that parts of it lie at a depth of roughly 80 to 100 metres, perhaps more, while its internal layout remains unknown.
Granite differs from ordinary soil in its hardness and resistance to penetration. It is a dense igneous rock, usually between 2,600 and 2,750 kilograms per cubic metre, with high compressive strength.
But the mountain's resistance does not depend on rock type alone. Natural fractures, geological joints, the depth of the chambers and the way they were built all determine how shocks and collapses propagate.
More importantly, public intelligence does not establish that the mountain currently houses an operating enrichment facility. On 16 October 2026, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), an independent American think tank, reported that satellite images taken on the seventh of that month showed, according to its analysis, that the main entrances remained sealed, and it assessed that the facility was probably not operating or undergoing major construction at that time. This remains an assessment based on external imagery, not a definitive confirmation.
Consequently, it is not known with certainty whether the facility contains centrifuges, nuclear material, or merely equipment linked to the Iranian programme.
Second: the first scenario, massive conventional bombing
Suppose Washington decided to launch a major strike using precision missiles and high explosive conventional bombs.
Such strikes could cause local rockfalls, damage the surface installations, and put the complex out of use for a period that could be long or short depending on the extent of the damage and Iran's ability to repair it.
The United States might use huge bombs of the GBU-43/B class, known as the "Mother of All Bombs". These are non nuclear weapons designed to produce an enormous blast wave and overpressure, but they are not built for deep penetration of granite.
The difference between destroying a facility and disabling it is that the collapse of part of the mountain does not necessarily mean the collapse of its inner chambers.
Washington might thus announce that the operation succeeded, while part of the facility remains intact and the true extent of the damage stays unknown.
This is the possibility that turns mountains into strategic fortresses: a facility may stop working without having been destroyed.
Third: the second scenario, GBU-57 bunker busters
The United States possesses the GBU-57, known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, one of the most powerful conventional bombs designed to penetrate hardened underground facilities.
It weighs about 13.6 tonnes in total and carries a high explosive charge inside a metal casing designed to withstand impact with rock, soil and fortified structures.
It is delivered by the American B-2 stealth bomber.
Public estimates suggest a penetration capability of up to about 60 metres in certain ground conditions, and less in harder rock. These figures are not fixed engineering guarantees, and they cannot be applied directly to Pickaxe Mountain without precise geological data.
If the main chambers lie beneath about 100 metres of granite, there is no public scientific basis for asserting that this bomb can reach them directly.
But a bomb does not always need to penetrate an inner chamber to cause damage. The explosion can generate vibrations, pressure waves and deformation in the rock mass, although these effects diminish and change with distance and geology.
In a hypothetical scenario of repeated bombardment, surface damage could accumulate and fractures could multiply, without guaranteeing a direct path to the depths.
The likely result is a facility that is isolated, damaged or out of service, not one proven to be permanently destroyed.
Fourth: the third scenario, using a tactical nuclear weapon
Here we move from conventional war to a strategic shift unprecedented since 1945.
Suppose, in a fictional scenario, that the American administration concluded that conventional strikes were insufficient and decided to use a low yield nuclear weapon against the mountain area.
A nuclear explosion differs radically from a conventional one.
Instead of relying on the chemical reaction of explosives, a nuclear weapon releases enormous energy from nuclear reactions, generating pressure waves, heat and ionising radiation.
In a nuclear explosion close to the ground, the rock could suffer violent fracturing, ground shock and intense heat, with the possible formation of a large crater and local collapses.
Yet even a nuclear weapon is not a magic machine that automatically digs down 100 or 1,500 metres. The outcome depends on the nature of the explosion, the geology, the shape of the facility and how well the energy couples with the rock mass.
The inner chambers could be severely damaged, and part of the complex could collapse, but the scale of destruction cannot be inferred from the explosive yield alone.
Most dangerous of all, a nuclear weapon would create a new radiological hazard, independent of any Iranian material inside the facility.
If the explosion touched the ground surface and threw up large quantities of rock and dust, these could mix with radioactive fission products and turn into fallout carried by the wind.
The first challenge for the Iranian authorities might then be protecting the population, monitoring air and water, and mapping contaminated zones.
If, on the other hand, the explosion took place underground and its products were effectively contained, atmospheric release might be far smaller. But containment cannot be assumed in a damaged mountain facility, especially given the likely presence of fractures and pathways for gas leakage.
Fifth: the fourth scenario, GBU bombs followed by a hydrogen explosion
This is the most extreme scenario, a theoretical assumption not based on any American announcement of a decision to use a hydrogen bomb.
Imagine that the conventional attack damaged the mountain but did not confirm the destruction of the facility, and that escalation then led to the use of a thermonuclear weapon.
A hydrogen weapon relies on nuclear fusion reactions, with a fission reaction used to start the process in known designs. It is not free of radioactive contamination, and the label "hydrogen" alone does not determine its explosive yield.
If a weapon of very large destructive power were used, the damage could extend beyond the facility to a wider area of terrain, installations and population.
And if conventional explosions had already fractured the rock beforehand, that damage would not allow a reliable prediction of whether the subsequent nuclear explosion would reach the inner chambers or achieve complete destruction.
It would, however, add another layer of geological and environmental uncertainty.
A cloud of dust and radioactive material could form, and the area could be exposed to contamination of varying severity depending on the characteristics of the explosion and the weather.
In that case the issue would no longer be merely disabling an Iranian nuclear programme, but the use of a nuclear weapon against another state, with all that this entails in terms of a war that could widen and escalate in ways that are hard to control.
Sixth: could there be an "Iranian Chernobyl"?
Here it becomes necessary to distinguish between three different hazards.
The first hazard: uranium inside the facility.
If Pickaxe Mountain houses only centrifuge manufacturing equipment and holds no significant quantities of nuclear material, conventional bombing would not necessarily create widespread radioactive contamination.
If it does contain uranium or its compounds, the destruction of equipment and containers could cause localised contamination, whose severity would vary with the quantities, the chemical form and the means of dispersal.
The second hazard: the chemical compounds used in enrichment.
Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is used in uranium enrichment. If it leaks and reacts with moisture in the air, it can produce hydrogen fluoride and toxic uranium compounds.
Here the direct chemical danger to workers and nearby teams may be more pressing than the external radiological danger.
The third hazard: radiation from the hypothetical American nuclear weapon.
This is the gravest in a nuclear explosion scenario, because of the radioactive products generated by the weapon itself and the possibility that some of them travel with dust and wind.
It is wrong to automatically compare a uranium enrichment facility to the Chernobyl reactor. An operating reactor holds a different inventory of fission products, and a nuclear explosion does not arise simply from bombing a stockpile of enriched uranium.
In other words: an enrichment facility does not turn into an atomic bomb because it is bombed.
Seventh: would radiation reach the Gulf, Lebanon and Iraq?
In a nuclear explosion scenario that produces fallout, danger zones are not determined by geographical distance alone.
Wind direction, the height of the cloud, rainfall and the size of the radioactive particles all determine the paths of dispersal and where material settles on the ground.
The most dangerous areas may lie beyond ground zero in the direction of the wind, while other areas, farther away or even closer, may be less exposed.
It therefore cannot be said that Lebanon, Iraq or the Gulf states would inevitably suffer dangerous radioactive contamination, nor can cross border transport be ruled out without measurements and meteorological modelling.
The risks of contamination lie in inhaling particles, in the contamination of water, soil and agricultural produce, as well as in external exposure to radiation.
Some environmental effects could last a long time, depending on the types and quantities of radioactive isotopes and where they settle.
Determining safe areas would require independent radiation monitoring, environmental testing, and international cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the competent health authorities.
Eighth: what happens in the following hours and days?
In the conventional scenario, Washington might announce the success of the operation while Tehran insists that its facilities have held. The dispute could continue for weeks or months because of the difficulty of verifying internal damage.
In the nuclear scenario, however, the military repercussions would probably extend beyond Pickaxe Mountain immediately.
The Security Council could face an urgent international crisis, the major nuclear powers could enter extraordinary security consultations, and fears would rise over shipping and energy supplies in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
The strike could also trigger an Iranian military response, direct or indirect, as well as waves of displacement and environmental fears inside and outside Iran.
This does not mean that all these outcomes would occur, but that they are plausible paths of escalation in a hypothetical scenario in which the conflict crosses the threshold of nuclear use.
Conclusion: can America destroy the mountain, or will it destroy the rules of war themselves?
The United States has immense destructive power, but it has no technical guarantee that every facility dug deep into granite can be wiped out by bombing.
A conventional attack might disable Pickaxe Mountain without permanently ending its capabilities, while the use of a nuclear weapon could make the human, environmental and strategic costs far greater than the original military objective.
The paradox is that the bomb with the greater destructive power is not necessarily the tool that achieves the better strategic result.
Military force can destroy buildings, tunnels and equipment, but it cannot erase scientific knowledge, nor does it necessarily prevent the programme from being rebuilt elsewhere.
If the ultimate goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, success is not measured by the size of the crater the bomb leaves, but by the ability to prevent nuclear proliferation in a sustainable and verifiable way.
The question that should be asked in Washington is not only: can we destroy Pickaxe Mountain? It is also: what if the price of trying to destroy it is opening the door to nuclear war in the Middle East?
Peter Germanos