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Israel's Election: Netanyahu Did Not Win, Eisenkot Did Not Defeat Him... and the Arabs May Decide the Future Government

Israel election 2026 cover image
Photo: Gary Todd, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

The election of 27 October 2026 has plunged Israel into a new political impasse. According to preliminary results, Netanyahu has not secured a parliamentary majority allowing him to keep governing, while his rival Gadi Eisenkot has failed to achieve a decisive victory enabling him to form an alternative government.

According to the partial count published by the Central Elections Committee on the morning of 28 October, with over four million valid votes counted (about 70% of ballots cast, before the "double envelopes" of soldiers, diplomats, hospitals and prisons), Netanyahu's bloc holds 54 seats: Likud 27, United Torah Judaism 7, Shas 7, Otzma Yehudit 7 and Religious Zionism 6. The Jewish led opposition holds 47: Eisenkot's Yashar 21, Together (Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid) 11, the Democrats (Yair Golan) 8 and Yisrael Beiteinu (Avigdor Liberman) 7. The Arab lists hold 19: the Joint List 13 and Ra'am 6. These figures are preliminary and may shift by a seat or more.

First, Netanyahu remains strong

Despite the fallout of the 7 October 2023 attack, successive wars and internal divisions, Netanyahu has kept a broad base. Likud remains the largest party with about 829,000 votes, or 20.7% of votes counted. But popularity is not enough in Israel's system: a government needs the confidence of 61 of 120 members, and his bloc is still seven seats short.

Second, Eisenkot is not Netanyahu's strategic opposite

He is a former IDF Chief of Staff and belongs to the same security establishment. His list came second with about 640,000 votes, nearly 16%. He may be more moderate in tone, closer to Washington and Europe, and more open to diplomatic understandings, but he does not fundamentally differ from Netanyahu on security goals regarding Iran, Hezbollah and Gaza. The core difference lies in the means of managing the conflict, not necessarily its goals.

Third, the Arab parties may become kingmakers

Overall turnout reached 77.7%, about 5.7 million of roughly 7.33 million eligible voters, the highest since 1999 and 7.1 points above 2022. Most striking, Arab turnout approached 80% according to Channel 12, exceeding the national rate for the first time, with Sakhnin near 87% and Kafr Qasim near 85%. This lifted the Arab lists to 19 seats in the partial count.

The arithmetic is simple: 47 opposition seats plus 19 Arab seats make 66, above the majority. Yet some Jewish parties opposed to Netanyahu refuse to rely on Arab parties to form a government. Thus an arithmetic majority to topple Netanyahu may exist without a political majority able to govern.

Fourth, the crisis runs deeper than the election: a legal and constitutional reading

Israel has no single written constitution but a set of Basic Laws. Basic Law: The Knesset provides for 120 members elected in general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections. The whole country is one constituency, and voters choose a closed party list rather than individual candidates.

The Knesset Elections Law sets a threshold of 3.25% of valid votes, in force since 2014, roughly 130,000 votes in the current count. Its effect is direct: Yoaz Hendel's Reservists list stayed below it at about 2.6%, and Ofer Winter's People of Israel at about 1.7%, wasting votes that could have helped the right. Seats are allocated by the Bader Ofer method, a variant of D'Hondt that slightly favours larger lists, and lists may sign surplus vote agreements pooling their remainders for the last seats. The Central Elections Committee, chaired by a Supreme Court justice, runs the process. Section 7A of the Basic Law allows a list or candidate to be barred for negating Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state, incitement to racism, or supporting the armed struggle of a hostile state or terrorist organisation against Israel, subject to Supreme Court review.

Basic Law: The Government governs coalition building. The President consults the factions and tasks the member most likely to form a government, with 28 days extendable by 14. If that fails, a second member may be tasked for 28 days. If that also fails, 61 members may, within 21 days, ask in writing that a specific member be tasked. Otherwise the Knesset is dissolved and new elections are held. A government takes office only after winning the Knesset's confidence and can be removed only by a constructive vote of no confidence, in which 61 members back an alternative government and prime minister. Until then the outgoing government continues in office, so Netanyahu remains prime minister throughout the negotiations.

This proportional system, with its single constituency and relatively low threshold, gives small religious and nationalist parties great power to block government formation. Negotiations may last weeks and could end in a fragile government or new elections.

As for Lebanon

It is a mistake to think Netanyahu's departure would automatically change Israeli policy. Northern border security, Hezbollah's weapons and confronting Iranian influence enjoy broad consensus within Israel's security establishment, even if politicians differ on means and timing.

The prime minister may change, and diplomatic language may soften, but Israel's security doctrine will not change merely because the parliamentary majority does.

Conclusion

Israel today is politically divided, yet more cohesive in its security orientation than its party quarrels suggest. The key lesson for Lebanon and the Arab world is that elections may change governments, but they do not necessarily change the policies and strategies of states.

Figures are preliminary, based on the Central Elections Committee's partial count as of the morning of 28 October 2026.

Also available in Arabic. Originally published on LinkedIn.